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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MARJUHJ C J.

DURAND,

Plaintiff-Appellant,,
Case No. 19033

vs.

CEDAR CITY CORPORATION,
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR O.
STEWART and GRANT HINCHCLIFF,
Defendants-Respondents.
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover damages for plaintiff's personal injuries occurring when a subject of an arrest fired a
rifle at the defendant police officers and a bullet entered
the plaintiff's nearby trailer home.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and entered summary judgment in favor of defendants.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the summary judgment of the

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff has failed to comply with
October 3,

l'JB3

C<)Urt's ,,,

in that her Statement of Facts cuntair, 0

citations to tl1e record on appeal and thereby fails tn
form with Rule 75(p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

cr-

Ran,:

than controverting each of the numerous facts alleged in
plaintiff's Statement of Facts that are totally unsupporte;
by the record,

defendants submit the following Statement oi

Facts, which is fully supported by the record.
On February 21,

1979, shortly after midnight, defendants

H. L. Bradley (hereinafter "Bradley"), Arthur O. Stewart
(hereinafter "Stewart") and Grant Hinchcliff (hereinafter
"Hinchcliff"),

three officers of the Police Department of

defendant Cedar City Corporation, were involved in a
with Mr. Neil Anderson (hereinafter "Neil") at Kelly's
Trailer Park in Cedar City, Utah.
the death of
Trailer Park,

The gunfight resulted ir,

Plaintiff, another resident of Kelly's
received a gunshot wound in her right foot,

resulting in the injuries of which she complains.

( R. 54,

Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 35-37).
Earlier, on the evening of February 20,

1979, Neil was a

passenger in a vehicle being driven by Eugene Anderson (here·
inafter "Eugene"), his brother.

At approximately 11:20 tha•.

evening, Hinchcliff and officer Bruce Marshall,

-2-

also oft!·"

L,r

r·1

ty Police Department, stopped the vehicle Eugene was

,, because they suspected that he was operating the
re

under the influence of alcohol.

,,,,1f-Is0n vehicle,
wer? intoxicated.

Upon approaching the

it was apparent to the officers that both
Eugene was arrested for driving under the

influence of alcohol and both Andersons were taken to the
Iron County jail.

(R. 21, 1111 2-3).

After breathalyzer tests

were performed at the jail, Hinchcliff contacted Neil's wife,
Sharlene Anderson (hereinafter "Sharlene"), and requested
that she come to the jail and transport Neil to the Anderson
home (the car was impounded as neither Eugene nor Neil were
fit to drive).

When Sharlene arrived, she protested taking

her husband home because in her opinion he could be argumentative and make trouble when intoxicated.

Nevertheless,

because Neil was controllable and cooperative, he was
released to his wife's custody and was taken home.
'1'1 4-5;

R.

(R. 21,

29, 1111 2-4).

When Neil arrived at home, he began making threats about
getting his gun and returning to the jail to obtain his
brother's release by force.

Sharlene, alarmed by her hus-

tand's conduct, telephoned the Cedar City Police Department
offices and notified the person answering that her husband
wes being very abusive and threatening force with his gun.
-. R.

)I

'1

6;

R.

22, '1 2; R. 23, '1 2; R. 29, 11 4).

-3-

Bradley, Stewart and Hinchcliff responded tc, SharlP 1,,.
call and traveled to the trailer park in two separate
cars.

When they arrived at the Anderson trailer,

observed Neil inside with a rifle in his hand.

F ,1

Bradley

Sharlene

believes that Bradley could have disarmed Neil in the
trailer.

(R. 29, 1l 4).

However, Bradley states that when,,

approached the trailer, Neil had the rifle in his hands anc
there was no opportunity to disarm him.

(R.

22, 1!1! 5-6).

;.

is undisputed that at some time all the officers retreated
and Neil stepped onto the porch with the rifle.

Despite the

efforts of the three officers, and Sharlene, to assure Neil
that Eugene was being released from jail, Neil would not
the gun down.
H

3-5, 7-8;

put

(R. 21, 111! 7, 9-11; R. 22, 1!1! 3-5, 7-8; R. 2J,
R.

29, 1l 4).

Plaintiff's trailer was located across the street west c'
the Anderson trailer and was situated such that the south
half of it was in a direct line with the porch where Neil wa:
standing.

Stewart took a position in a small grassy area

slightly northwest of the porch where Neil was standing and
due east of plaintiff's trailer.

Hinchcliff took cover in

the street behind a pickup truck northwest of the Anderson
trailer and Bradley took cover behind the northwest corner:.
the Anderson trailer.

(R. 21, 1!1! 8-10, 12

&

attached dia-

gram; R. 22, 1!1! 3, 5, 7; R. 23, 1!1! 3-5, 1, 10).

-4-

w1. i le
1

lloe

UJl•I,

pointing the rifle in Stewart's direction, Neil
rifle and Stewart heard the bullet pass him to the

heading directly toward plaintiff's trailer.

All

three officers returned fire, striking Neil, who collapsed,
firing one more round that struck a Chevrolet parked in the
Anderson driveway.

Stewart and the other officers were at

all times standing with their backs to plaintiff's trailer
during the exchange of gunfire.
'IT'il

(R.

10-12, 14; R. 23, 'IT'il 10-12, 15).

21, 'IT'il 12-15, 17; R. 22,
Indeed, plaintiff admits

in her deposition that the bullet that entered her trailer
and hit her came from the direction of the Anderson trailer.
(R. 54, Deposition of Marjorie Jane Durand at 41-44 & Exhibit
1).

There is no evidence that the bullet that injured plain-

tiff was fired by anyone other than Neil.
ARGUMENT
Although it is unclear from a reading of plaintiff's
brief, she apparently maintains that there are three genuine
issues of material fact:
1.

Whether defendants were negligent in allowing Neil

to leave the jail in a drunken condition with full knowledge
of his dangerous nature and propensity for violence;

-5-

2.

Whether defendants were neglic1er.t

!II

failing tc.

respond to Sharlene's call in a professional manr.er ly
ing to disarm Neil and confronting

l11m,

resulting in

exchange of gunfire; and
3.

Whether defendants' acts should be legally pro-

tected.1
The third issue is clearly a question of law answered"
the affirmative by the lower court.

It is, of course, one c·

the ultimate legal issues to be decided by this court.
Neither the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley nor the deposition of plaintiff,

the only evidence presented to counter

defendants' affidavits,

2

raise any genuine issue as to

whether defendants were negligent.

Indeed, even when the

l
Plaintiff has apparently abandoned her previous
claim that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire
the trailer park.
2
Plaintiff submitted the affidavits of Patrick H.
Fenton and Jay Jenson at the time of the original hearing m
the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 28, 30).
The affidavit
of Patrick H. Fenton merely contained the opinions, interpe·
tations and conclusions of counsel regarding the affidavits
of Hinchcliff, Bradley and Stewart, a function that is the
province of the court.
The affidavit of Jay Jenson expresse:
an opinion concerning the bullet that entered plaintiff's
trailer, which opinion was wholly without foundation.
affidavits would be inadmissible as evidence.
Therefore,
both affidavits were properly stricken by the lower court
pursuant to Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Walker v. Rock
Mountain Recreation Cor ., 29 Utah 2d 274,
508 P.2d 538, 542 1973 • See also Go Real Estate Co. v.
Smyth, No. 19057 (Utah November---:r;-1983).

-6-

a1P

viewed entirely in plaintiff's favor and even if

' , ',ts were shown to be negligent in some respect,
10

r1c

such

arP immaterial because defendants had no special duty

to prutect plaintiff and her claims are barred by the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
POINT I
DEFENDANTS WERE NOT NEGLIGENT, AS A MATTER
OF LAW
The affidavits submitted by both parties, and any other
facts presently in the record, establish that there is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether defendants
were negligent.
In general, this court has defined negligence as "the
failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have
done under the circumstances, or doing what such person under
such circumstances would not have done."

Meese v. Brigham

Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981).

Accord,

Evans v. Stuart, 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 1001 (1966).
An application of the definition of negligence to the
circumstances indicates that there is no issue as to whether
defendants were negligent; they clearly were not.

While

plaintiff claims that defendants negligently released Neil,
it

'""

is clear they had no legal basis to hold him.

Neil could

ue held for drunken driving since he was not driving, nor

could defendants legally have held Neil simply because
-7-

Sharlene was concerned about what

do,

especial]/

since Neil was cooperative and rational when leavin<J tltc
jail.

Having no realistic basis to detain Nei 1. defenrliud

had no choice but to release him.

Thus, under the circum-

stances of the situation, defendants could not be negligee•
for releasing Anderson.
Plaintiff then claims that defendants were negligent in
failing to disarm Neil and choosing instead to confront hir
in the gunfight.

Assuming that Bradley or any of the other

defendants had an opportunity to disarm Neil in the trailer,
as suggested by the affidavit of Sharlene Rowley,

there is r.'.

evidence that their failure to do so constituted negligence.
Sharlene offers the unsupported opinion that Bradley could
have disarmed Neil, yet offers no explanation as to how it
could have been accomplished.

It is clear that she is

attempting to second-guess Bradley's decision.

Bradley

no knowledge of the conditions in the trailer.

Under the

circumstances,

it would have been unreasonable for Bradley:·

the other defendants to risk their lives and the lives of
others, perhaps children,

to attempt to disarm Neil and coo-

front him in the confined trailer.

Surely, defendants cannc:

be negligent in failing, by some undisclosed method, to dis·
arm Anderson under the circumstances at the time.

-8-

r ", t her more,
t''
1

1. I•··

what choice did defendants have once Neil

the porch with a rifle pointed at them?

No reason-

f'E'rSOll would expect them to request Neil to go to a

sev)uded field to wield his gun and shoot at defendants.
undPr the circumstances, defendants had no choice but to confront Anderson in the trailer park.
POINT II
DEFENDANTS OWED PLAINTIFF NO INDIVIDUAL
DUTY TO PROTECT HER FROM HARM
Even assuming that defendants were negligent in some
respect, such negligence is not material because without the
breach of legally recognized duty, there can be no recovery.
"Negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do."
F. Pollock, Law of Torts 468 (13th ed. 1929).
Defendants do not deny that the police have a general
duty to protect the health, lives and morals of the public.
However, a city or its police have no duty to an individual
for injuries directly resulting from the criminal acts of a
third person, even if the city or its police somehow breached
the general duty to protect the safety of the public.

In

Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d 160 (1971), plaintiff filed suit against the Cache County Sheriff and his
deputy

aamages and the officers' removal from office

tur Lheir alleged willful and wanton failure to investigate a
burglary of the plaintiff's store.
-9-

Upon defendants' motion,

the lower court dismissed the complaint.
court affirmed the dismissal.

On appeal,

this

Citing Massengill v. Yuma

County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969),

this court w1 ,

L,

[W]e believe that defendants' contention that failure by a public sheriff to investigate a crime
claimed by an individual to have been committed,
ordinarily is a matter of judgment and discretion,
not actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by
an individual since the public official's duty is to
the public, - he being accountable to and removable
in a proper proceeding, by the public.
Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (footnotes
omitted).
In Massengill, a deputy sheriff failed to apprehend and
arrest two speeding, intoxicated drivers before they were
involved in an accident resulting in the death of plaintiffs'
decedent.

The trial court dismissed the action by plaintiffs

against the County and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the defendant owed no duty to the deceased as an
individual.

Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456

P.2d 376, 381 (1969).

The Arizona court further stated that

the duty imposed upon a police officer was a duty to the publie in general and not to any particular person.

Accord-

ingly, the failure to adequately discharge a police officer'
function would result in a public rather than a private
injury, with recourse being had,

if at all, through public

prosecution rather than through a civil action for damages
Id., 456 P.2d at 379.
-10-

i\r1<•ther case supporting the Obray rule is Keane v. City
98 Ill. App. 2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968) •
.

e,

the trial court dismissed an action brought by the

husband of a school teacher for failing to provide police
prutection to the teacher, who was attacked and killed by a
student while on school premises.

The Illinois Court of

Appeals affirmed, holding that the duty of the city to protect the plaintiff's decedent from criminal acts was no
greater than its "general duty to all citizens to protect the
safety and well-being of the public at large."

Id. at 322.

The court also provided the following public policy support

tor its holding that there should be no recovery for breach
of a general public duty:
To hold that under the circumstances alleged in the
complaint the city owed a "special duty" to Mrs.
Keane for the safety and well-being of her person
would impose an all but impossible burden upon the
City, considering the numerous police, fire, housing
and other laws, ordinances and regulations in force.
Id.

Accord, Simpson Food Fair, Inc. v. City of Evansville,

149 Ind. App. 387, 272 N.E.2d 871, 873-76 (1971).
The proposition that defendants owed plaintiff no special
duty is further illustrated in Evers v. Westerberg, 38 A.D.2d
751, 329 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1972).

There, the police allowed an

intoxicated motorist to drive his car away from the scene of
accident.

The driver was involved in a second collision

some 20 minutes later, killing another motorist.
-11-

The lower

court entered judgment for plaintiff, who was administret
of the estate of the deceased motorist.

1

The New Yori; s"I"

court, Appellate Division, modified the judgment, hcldiny
that although the intoxicated driver defendant was liable,
the defendant village was not liable for failing to arrest
the intoxicated driver and allowing him to leave the scene
the first accident.

The court further stated:

It is well settled that a municipality, acting
in its governmental capacity for the protection of
the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a
mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a
particular individual to whom it has assumed no
special duty.
The Village's alleged failure to
enforce its regulations and the Vehicle and Traffic
Law by arresting Westerberg for intoxication, taking
his car keys or impounding his automobile falls
squarely within this rule of nonliability.
It owed
no special duty to Mr. and Mrs. Evers and through
its officers, did not take any affirmative action
which resulted in injury to a member of the public.
Id., 329 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (citations omitted)
original).

(emphasis in

Accord, Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So. 2d

365, 366-67 (Fla. App. 1969).
In the instant case, plaintiff cannot demonstrate any
special duties owed to her by defendants, aside from their
general duty to protect the public.

Indeed, the negligence,

ii any, of defendants in releasing Neil from police custod)
while he was still intoxicated, or in failing to disarm him,
is much less culpable than that of the police in Evers, who
released an intoxicated driver who they did have a legal

-12-

0,

' ' to detain and who had already been involved in one

111

the event that plaintiff's earlier additional conten-

tion that defendants were negligent in scattering gunfire
comes before this court, there is overwhelming authority, in
addition to the foregoing, to the effect that municipalities
are not liable for injuries to others resulting from the fulfillment or breach of the general duty to apprehend wrongdoers.

See,

Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J. Super. 530, 229

A.2d 281, 284 (1967)

(police not liable for injuries to

bystander, caused by apprehension of fleeing motorist whose
reckless acts are the proximate cause of the injuries); Scott
v. City of New York, 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788

(innocent bystander injured by gunshot wound resulting
from police apprehension of escaped prisoner cannot recover
from city who owed no special duty to bystander even if the
police were negligent in permitting the escape),

9

N.Y.2d 764, 215 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1961).
Based upon Obray and the ample authority from other
jurisdictions, it is evident that even if defendants were
somehow negligent by releasing the intoxicated Neil, in failing to disarm him, or in confronting Neil in the gunfight and
scattering gunfire, they cannot be liable to plaintiff
Lecause she has not shown, and cannot show, that defendants
breached any more than their general duty to the public.
-13-

Thus, although plaintiff could perhaps maintain a cause of
action against Neil's estate for Neil's acts in initiatir,ci
the confrontation with defendants, she has

TJO

basis

fur

recovery against defendants.
POINT I I I
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
A.

Plaintiff's Claims are Barred LY Governmental Immun-

Aside from the fact that defendants cannot be liable to
plaintiff for any negligent breach of their general duty to
the public, they are immune from suit under the provisions of
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which provides:

"Except

as may be otherwise provided in this Act, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results
from the exercise of a governmental function

Utah

Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (Supp. 1983).
There is no dispute that defendants were involved in a
governmental function under the test established in
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., GOS P.2d 1230 (Utah
1980).

There, this court stated the following general rule

for determining whether an activity is a governmental function:

"[T]he test for determining governmental immunity is

whether the activity under consideration is of such a unique
nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agen
-14-

or that it is essential to the core of governmental activId. at 1236-37.
11 ..

th1ng could be more essential to the core of governmen-

ta! ciCtivity than the enforcement of the laws and maintenance
of peace and order performed by a city police department and
its officers.

Consequently, other provisions of the Utah

covernmental Immunity Act apply.

The applicable section of

the act provides:
(1)
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by negligent
act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of his employment except if the injury:
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused .
Id., § 63-30-lO(l)(a)

(emphasis added).

AssumJng defendants had a choice regarding whether to
release Neil or whether to disarm or confront him, those
choices were discretionary functions within the meaning of
Section 63-30-lO(l)(a).

Although plaintiff argues that these

decisions were a matter of "duty", not discretion, she cites
no legal authority in support of that contention.
This court has applied Section 63-30-lO(l)(a) to a fact
situation analogous to the one at bar.

In Epting v. State,

54f P.2d 242 (Utah 1976), the minor children of a murder
victim sued the State of Utah on the theory that its

-15-

employees were negligent in allowing a state prison
go on a work release program from which the prisonPr
murdered plaintiffs' mother.

]ef;

The trial court

11.,

complaint and this court affirmed, holding that the
officials were involved in the exercise of a discretionary
function when they placed the prisoner on work release and
thus were immune from suit under Section 63-30-lO(l)(a).
court further stated that it was discretionary with prison
officials as to whether it would be valuable and practicable
to place a particular prisoner on the work release program,
Id. at 243-44.

See also Amato v. United States, 549 F. SuPf.

863, 866 (D.N.J. 1982)

(decision not to arrest person prior

to his commission of bank robbery that it was known by police
officers would be committed was a discretionary function
under the virtually identical discretionary function exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act).

In the instant case,

the decision of whether to release Neil, assuming there was
some legal ground to hold him the first place, was also discretionary and defendants are immune from suit pursuant to
Section 63-30-lO(l)(a).
At best, the only possible legal basis that defendants
had for arresting and holding Neil (a basis that is only ter.uously supported by the record) was for the offense of intoxication.

Utah Code Ann.§ 76-9-701 (Supp. 1983).

-16-

However,

,,,,, 76-9-701 further provides that a peace officer may at
i•scretion release an individual arrested for intoxicall'"'

if he believes imprisonment would be unnecessary.

\ 76-9-701 ( 2).

Id.

Thus, even if defendants could have held Neil

for intoxication, the very statute giving them the right to
hold Neil provides that the decision to release him was the
exercise of a discretionary function.
According to the Florida Supreme Court, the decision not
to disarm Neil and to otherwise confront him was also discretionary.

In Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132 (Fla.

1970), plaintiffs alleged that a decision not to confront
political demonstrators constituted negligence and had proximately caused property damage that resulted when the demonstration got out of control.

The lower court dismissed the

complaint and both the Florida Court of Appeals and the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the decision of
whether to confront the demonstrators was discretionary, and
that the decisionmakers were not subject to liability.
court stated further:
While sovereign immunity is a salient issue
here, we ought not lose sight of the fact that
inherent in the right to exercise police powers is
the right to determine strategy and tactics for the
deployment of those powers •
The sovereign
authorities ought to be left free to exercise their
discretion and choose the tactics deemed appropriate
without worry over possible allegations of negligerice.
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The

Id. at 134.
The rule of Wong is applicable in the instant case
decision of whether to release Neil and the rlecision of
whether to attempt to disarm him or confront him were decisions involving judgment, tactics and strategy.

The defen-

dants were confronted with a dangerous and difficult situation which they handled as well as they could, and according
to their own best judgment.

Their actions should not be

judicially second-guessed since they clearly involve matter 5
of discretion.

Therefore, pursuant to Section

63-30-lO(l)(a), defendants are immune from suit and plaintiff's action against them should be barred.
B.

Plaintiff's Claims are Barred by Virtue of Her Failing to Comply with Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of
the Governmental Immunity Act.

In addition to providing defendants immunity from suit ii
this case, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that
plaintiff file a proper and adequate notice of claim and tha:
she provide or file a bond or undertaking.

Contrary to

plaintiff's contention that these procedural requirements
were raised by separate motion, defendants' original Motion
for Summary Judgment specifically states as one of its
grounds that plaintiff failed to comply with the above
requirements.

Thus, since the lower court's reasons for
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1 111g

the summary judgment were not stated (R. 46, 47),

"' tff's failure to comply with these provisions could
,,,_,I 1,ave bee!l a hasis for the grant of summary judgment.
In Scarborough v. Granite School District,

531 P.2d 480,

482 (Utah 1975), this Court stated that "full compliance with
[the Utah Governmental Immunity Act] requirements is a condit1on precedent to the right to maintain a suit."

Plaintiff

has failed to properly comply with Sections 63-30-11 and
63-30-19 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The 1978 version of Section 63-30-11, the version most
likely applicable here, provides:
Any person having a claim for injury to person or
property against a governmental entity or its
employee shall, before maintaining an action under
this act, file a written notice of claim with such
entity for appropriate relief including money damages. The notice of claim shall set forth a brief
statement of the facts and the nature of the claim
asserted, shall be signed by the person making the
claim or such person's agent, attorney, parent or
legal guardian, and shall be directed and delivered
to the responsible governmental entity within the
time prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as
applicable.
l_cl., § 63-30-11 (Supp. 1981).

See also
-----

Yates v. Vernal

Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980);
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482
(Utah 1975).
Defendants admit that plaintiff filed a purported notice
•

with the Cedar City Corporation and that it was
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filed within the prescribed time.

A copy of the notice uf

claim that was filed is attached as Exhibit
tiff's brief.

However,

"F" to p!C11r

that purported notice of claim Ll•

not comply with the essentials established in Section
63-30-11.
s ions.

It merely reports facts and makes legal conclu-

There is no formal demand for any kind of money dam-

ages or other relief from the city.
of the claim asserted is unclear.

Furthermore, the natuie
Consequently, since the

purported notice of claim attached to plaintiff's brief is
improper, and plaintiff failed to file a proper and timely
notice of claim within one year after the cause of action
arose, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (Supp. 1983), she is barred
from mcrintaining this action.
Even assuming that plaintiff has filed a proper and
timely notice of claim in compliance with Section 63-30-11,
she has not obtained or filed a bond as required under Section 63-30-19.

Plaintiff has evidently filed a bond pursuant

to Section 78-11-10 of the Utah Code, as required by virtue
of her action against the three individual respondents in
this case, but Section 63-30-19 requires an additional bond
be filed in order for plaintiff to maintain an action against
Cedar City Corporation.

It provides:

At the time of filing the action the plaintiff shall
file an undertaking in a sum fixed by the court, but
in no case less than the sum of $300, conditioned
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"ron

payment by the plaintiff of taxable costs
, , 1'ur red by the governmental entity in the action if
11,<> plaintiff fails to prosecute the action or fails
recover judgment.

Ii

c;I

·,,de Ann. § 63-30-19 (1978).

Based upon Scarborough,

failure to provide and file the bond required by
section 63-30-19 precludes her from pursuing this action.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to file a proper and timely notice
of claim and has failed to obtain and file an appropriate
bond as required by Sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-19 of the
Governmental Immunity Act.
the outset.

Thus, her action is precluded at

But, even assuming plaintiff has met these pro-

ceoural requirements, her action still fails on the merits.
The record establishes that there is no genuine issue of
material fact.

Defendants were not negligent, as a matter of

law, since under the circumstances, they simply had no choice
but to act as they did.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendants were negligent in
some respect, such negligence at best amounted to only a
breach of a general duty owed to the public at large for
which defendants cannot be held civilly liable to plaintiff.
Finally, pursuant to Section 63-30-lO(l)(a) of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, defendants are immune from suit
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since their alleged acts of negligence involved the pert,,
mance of a discretionary function.

Consequently, plinnt

action is barred.
For the above reasons,

the summary judgment of the lower

court should be affirmed.
DATED this

c2oifaay

of November, 1983.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTEN SEN

&

MARTINEAU

B

Respondents
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